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The US and the EU need a stronger dialogue on Russia sanctions 
 
Paul Ivan 
 
Following its annexation of Crimea and its military intervention in Ukraine, Russia has been sanctioned by the European 
Union (EU) and the United States (US). They have often stressed the coordination in their decisions, which has given more 
weight to the sanctions’ political message and impact. While the initial rounds of measures were not identical, differences in 
US and EU sanctions have amplified in the past two years. Washington has been readier to reinforce sanctions, the effect 
of which partially weakens over time. Some of the new actions are based on mounting evidence of the Kremlin’s 
involvement in the 2016 US presidential elections. The latest US sanctions, adopted in April 2018, further accentuated the 
differences between the two sanction regimes. The growing discrepancy tests the transatlantic partners, weakens their 
common stance, and risks portraying the EU as a more amenable player. The EU’s credibility on the Russia file would 
benefit from updating its sanctions. Transatlantic coordination also needs to be stepped up, including through increased 
engagement between administrations and at the level of the Congress. 
 
On 6 April 2018, the US imposed new sanctions on seven Russian oligarchs, 14 companies and 17 senior government 
officials. These measures are a response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Syria and its attempts to destabilise Western 
democracies, including through malicious cyber activities. The latest sanctions were significant since the restrictions have 
hit publicly traded multinational companies, such as those controlled by Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska. Their impact was 
immediate: the value of the Deripaska-controlled Rusal, the leading aluminium producer outside China, fell by more than 
50% in the following days and his wealth decreased by USD 1.3 billion. The Russian stock market also dropped 
significantly, and the rouble suffered its most significant single-day drop in more than three years. Even Russian companies 
that are not on the sanctions list lost billions following the announcement of the sanctions, worsening Russia’s economic 
outlook. In the end, the sanctions had a broader impact than expected as they disrupted commodities markets, with global 
metal prices rising sharply. 
 
The extraterritorial dilemma 
 
The economic effects of the new US sanctions have been significant but their extraterritorial character, while increasing their 
bite, is also problematic for EU-US cooperation. The US Treasury-driven sanctions extend the restrictions to non-US 
companies who “knowingly facilitate significant transactions […] for or on behalf of" the individuals or organisations 
sanctioned. Their reach, therefore, goes far beyond the US and Russia, with most banks and other financial institutions 
deterred from conducting transactions with the sanctioned entities. 
 
The debate over the legality of US extraterritorial (or secondary) sanctions is not new. In the 1980s, US sanctions over 
Soviet pipelines in Europe prompted transatlantic controversies. Some of the extraterritorial aspects of the Countering 
America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) – the 2017 Congress sanctions bill – have been criticised both by 
the European Commission and, more vocally, by the (then) German and Austrian foreign ministers. CAATSA has been 
amended to take on board some of the European concerns. On 23 April, the US Treasury Department eased some of the 
sanctions on Rusal, one factor in the decision being a stronger than expected impact on US “partners and allies”. Despite 
the easing of these sanctions, they will continue to affect European companies with links with targeted Russian companies 
and business leaders.  
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Differences in motivation and scope 
 
Disparities in the sanction regimes can also be found in their justification and their "exit" conditions. While the latest US 
sanctions mention Russia’s “malign activity” in several fields, the EU sanctions are more focused. They are explicitly linked 
to Russia's behaviour in Ukraine and tied to the full implementation of the 2015 Minsk II agreements. As the motivations for 
US sanctions become more complex, the clarity of the political message sent to Moscow (and to US allies), as well as the 
measures Russia should take for the sanctions to be lifted, become less clear. 
 
Over the last couple of years, as the scope of US sanctions on Russia has been broadened, European sanctions have not 
seen major changes. The member states have managed to maintain the sanctions adopted in 2014 and 2015 – a no small 
feat given the diverse views among the EU28. The leading European powers (Germany, France and the UK) are supporting 
the sanctions regime, with the new German foreign minister appearing more critical of Russia’s behaviour than his 
predecessors. However, divisions on Russia among the EU-28 have not subsided, as exposed by the reaction to the recent 
nerve gas poisoning in Salisbury. While the coordinated Western response of expelling over 130 Russian intelligence 
officers and diplomats has sent a clear political message to Moscow, one-third of EU countries have not participated. 
 
The need for a stronger dialogue 
 
As the settlement of the conflict over Ukraine is at a standstill, the EU sanctions on Russia will most likely be maintained for 
the time being. However, sanctions should be seen as tools of foreign policy and not become the only policy. Lack of 
progress in the negotiations over the conflict in Donbas is fuelling negotiation fatigue in Europe. The two EU powers 
involved in the Normandy format (France and Germany) seem prepared to pass the responsibility to the US and the 
Surkov-Volker format of talks. This further diminishes the role of the EU, already only partially represented, but suits the 
Kremlin, who for reasons of status often prefers to negotiate directly with the US. 
 
Furthermore, the increase in tensions between Russia and the US is also marginalising the EU, bringing back to life old 
Cold War type of dynamics for which the consensus-driven European institutions seem ill fit. This is evident in the military 
realm but also at the diplomatic level. Following the attack in Salisbury, the first statement came from the leaders of Britain, 
the US, Germany and France. In such rapidly evolving situations, EU statements often look like an afterthought.  
 
As the US and European sanction regimes continue to diverge, as Washington shows less attention to the interests of the 
EU, and as US soft power decreases in Europe, it will become more challenging to maintain a united transatlantic front on 
this dossier. This trend should be reversed. Dialogue between the leaders is necessary, but a stronger engagement 
between administrations and at the level of the Congress will be essential for a better appreciation of respective positions 
and their coordination. To uphold the initial level of pressure on the Kremlin and preserve its credibility in this dossier, EU 
sanctions will also need to be reinforced, for example by modestly enlarging the list of individual restrictive measures. 
Otherwise, further transatlantic divergence on the Russia file will weaken the effectiveness of the actions taken, increase 
EU dis-unity on the issue and potentially create tensions between the transatlantic partners. Moreover, an EU out of step 
with Washington, affected by US sanctions but not participating in their design, will be worse off and will ultimately be more 
vulnerable to Russia’s pressure. 
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